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I.

INTRODUCTION

Questions regarding rights permeate family law, just as they do
other areas of the law. In teaching family law, one addresses
parents’ rights to custody and parenting time, grandparents’ rights
to visitation with their grandchildren, the rights of third-party
custodians, and, of course, the very right of the state to interfere
with family affairs in the first place. But a sub-text in all these
discussions is the question of whose rights are being considered
1
and to what extent, if at all, we can or should consider children as
2
having meaningful rights. If we do agree that there is such a thing
† Adjunct Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
Thanks to my volunteer research assistants, Christina Phillippi and Anne Rucker
for their invaluable help. I am also grateful to Associate Professor Nancy ver
Steegh for her comments on a draft of this article.
1. I will use the term “children” rather than “minors” in this article. For
child-protection purposes, the two can mean the same thing. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 260C.007, subdiv. 4 (2006) (“[c]hild” means an individual under 18 years of
age); § 260C.007, subdiv. 23 (“[m]inor” means an individual under 18 years of
age). But in paternity matters, for instance, a child is not necessarily a minor.
§ 257.60. And more importantly, the term “children’s rights” is far more
commonly used by commentators.
2. For the purposes of this article, I am assuming that for a right to be
meaningful, it has to be either enforceable or, at least, capable of being enforced.
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as children’s rights, then to what extent does the concept have any
content? This question arises particularly when we consider “hard”
cases such as DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
3
Services that involve children’s rights or lack of them. Additionally,
the matter is complicated because the very term “children’s rights”
4
is both broad and loose and because the notion of children’s
5
rights has been viewed as threatening to society. Some have also
feared that focusing on children’s rights may be harmful to the
6
long-term interests of children themselves. Moreover, children’s
rights advocates have conceived of children’s rights in different
7
ways, but seemingly without devising a concept that has been
8
either philosophically or politically persuasive.
This may be
because various rights principles have been created in the adult
9
world and do not work well when applied to children.
Nevertheless, if we conceive of children as having the capacity to
develop into autonomous citizens, it should be possible for our
legal system to foster that development in areas, such as family law,
where children have important and fundamental interests.
Part II of this article considers the historical development of
children’s rights from antiquity through more recent international
human rights instruments. Part III looks at several different
approaches to the concept of children’s rights and focuses on the
presupposition that children can or should be able to act
autonomously. Part IV considers the application of children’s
rights and autonomy in the specific context of legal standing.
3. 489 U.S. 189 (1989), discussed further infra Part III.
4. Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil
Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141, 152 (2004).
5. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Talking About Children’s Rights in Judicial
Custody and Visitation, 36 FAM. L.Q. 105, 107 (2002).
6. Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” in CHILD LAW 113, 115 (Harry
D. Krause ed., 1992).
7. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment
Perspective on the Rights of Children, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1585 (1995) (criticizing
concepts of children’s rights grounded in will theory and interest theory and
proposing an empowerment theory of children’s rights). See also Michael S. Wald,
Children’s Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 260–81 (1979)
(discussing different types of claims under the rubric of children’s rights).
8. Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights, 80 MINN. L. REV.
267 (1995). For Minow, at least by the 1980s, “the movement for children’s rights
had failed to secure a coherent political or intellectual foundation, not to mention
a viable constituency with political clout.” Id. at 287. This does not seem to have
changed in subsequent years.
9. See Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 114–15.
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Finally, Part V concludes that grounding concepts of children’s
rights on the basis of autonomy alone is inadequate; considers that
meaningful children’s rights might best be understood in a much
broader human rights context; and suggests that a form of
graduated standing for children consistent with children’s
developing capacities for acting autonomously may be appropriate
in certain family law cases, particularly in cases involving domestic
violence where children’s interests may be opposed to at least one
of their parents.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
A. Antiquity
At least according to early historians, children’s rights and
10
duties were unknown among uncivilized people. Far from being
considered autonomous beings, children were originally regarded
as a species of property. In classical Athens, the father of the family
had the right to decide whether to keep a new-born baby or to
11
expose it. Although an Athenian father did not have the right to
put his child to death, abandoning a child did not count as
12
13
homicide. Moreover, children could be sold into slavery and
14
parents were under no legal obligation to raise children.
Children born to an unmarried woman were not even considered
15
to be citizens. As a general rule, children and women could not
be expected to act autonomously and men were responsible for
16
Though not owed any
controlling and protecting them.
particular rights, children were obliged to honor parents and, if
17
necessary, to support them.
10. See generally, SAMUEL M. DAVIS & MORTIMER J. SCHWARTZ, CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS AND THE LAW 8 (1987).
11. A DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK CIVILIZATION 105 (Methuen 1970). By
contrast, in Sparta it was essentially the state making the equivalent decision. Id.
12. DOUGLAS M. MACDOUGALL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 91 (1978).
13. Id. at 80. For instance, daughters traditionally could be sold into slavery
for engaging in premarital sex though, as MacDougall notes, it seems unlikely that
Athenian fathers sold even their naughtiest daughters in the fourth and fifth
centuries. Id.
14. Id. at 91.
15. Alberto Maffi, Family and Property Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
ANCIENT GREEK LAW, 255 (Michael Gagarin & David Cohen eds., 2005).
16. MACDOUGALL, supra note 12, at 84.
17. Maffi, supra note 15, at 255. See also MACDOUGALL, supra note 12, at 91.
Under a law attributed to Solon, a son was liable to prosecution for maltreating his
parents if: he failed to provide food or housing to his parents or grandparents, he
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Similar duties of respect and support appear to have existed in
18
other ancient societies. Under Roman law, a father had absolute
19
20
power, patria potestas, over his children. The scope and extent of
paternal power changed over the centuries, and under later law, a
father’s power could be taken away if he abandoned a child or
21
prostituted a daughter. Nevertheless, the power of life and death
was not formally abolished until Constantine, and it is unlikely that
22
After
child abandonment was forbidden by law until 374.
23
Constantine, the law began to take greater notice of children,
24
though the notice that the law took was not always very protective.
But having said this, it is possible to make too much of what seems
to modern eyes to be a cavalier disregard of children. There can
be little doubt that parents loved their children in ancient times,
25
and childhood, at least for males, was a period during which
future citizens were trained and educated. Indeed, from classical
times through the time of Blackstone’s commentaries, there has
been at least a sense that fathers owed obligations to provide
26
maintenance, protection, and education to their children. But
for the most part, these were moral obligations; there were no
corresponding legal rights that children qua children could assert
used violence against them, or he failed to provide proper funeral rites when they
died. Id. But the duty to support was excused if the father had failed to teach him
a trade, had prostituted him, or he was illegitimate—under those circumstances,
the theory was that the father was at fault. Id. at 92.
18. See, e.g., RUSS VERSTEGG, EARLY MESOPOTAMIAN LAW 94 (2000); RUSS
VERSTEGG, LAW IN ANCIENT EGYPT 135 (2002); DAVIS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at
8–9.
19. Patria potestas included the power of life and death, the power of sale, the
power to give children in marriage and divorce them at pleasure, and the right to
give them in adoption and emancipate them at pleasure. R. W. LEE, THE ELEMENTS
OF ROMAN LAW 60–61 (4th ed. 1956).
20. WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION
TO MODERN LAW 241 (W. M. Grant & Sons 1989). While the Romans believed they
originated the doctrine of paternal power, it has been observed in a number of
pre-Roman societies. Id. at 254.
21. Id. at 260.
22. LEE, supra note 19, at 61. Constantine also permitted sale of new-born
children, though Justinian allowed it only in cases of extreme poverty. Id.
23. This was true at least in the case of natural children; illegitimate children
were in quite a different position and generally were unable to inherit or even to
have the opportunity to be legitimized. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND
CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 103 (1987)
24. Id.
25. But see DAVIS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 10 (suggesting that in Roman
times, elder daughters were entitled to an education as were their male
counterparts).
26. See generally id. at 7–21.
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27

B. Medieval and Pre-Reformation
The medieval view of children may have begun to diverge from
that prevailing during the classical period, though little survives
about adult attitudes toward children during the Anglo-Saxon
28
period from 500 to 1066. Evidence from burials does show that
children were often buried with grave-goods, like adults, and that
29
children with deformities were cared for and enabled to grow up.
But these may be exceptional cases, for “[o]f all the characteristics
in which the medieval age differs from the modern, none is so
30
striking as the comparative absence of interest in children.”
There are echoes of earlier ages in a tendency to leave babies and
young children to survive or die without great concern in their first
31
five or six years. Nonetheless, medieval parents appear to have
been sufficiently concerned to preserve and nurture children into
32
productive adulthood and it has been suggested that the eleventh
and twelfth centuries evidenced a new preoccupation with the
33
experiences of childhood. But during what came to be known as
the Middle Ages, there is little reason to believe that children were
27. But see BRUNDAGE, supra note 24, at 480. Brundage notes that evidence
from court records suggests that support orders for minor children were small, but
despite this, “judges had to intervene with both moral suasion and penal sanctions
in order to secure payments as ordered.” Id. Over 700 years later, perhaps the
only comment needed is plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.
28. Nicholas Orme, Childhood in Medieval England, in REPRESENTING
CHILDHOOD,
http://www.pitt.edu/AFShome/d/c/dch29/public/html/gubar/
medieval_child.htm.
29. Id. But see B. J. Peens & D. A. Louw, Children’s Rights: A Review, 19 MED. &
L. 31, 32–33 (2000). Peens and Louw refer to a number of studies that highlight
the worthlessness of children before the sixteenth century with children over the
age of six being considered small adults who had to participate in adult work. Id.
No doubt childhood was short and, no doubt, not as pleasant as it could be by
modern standards, but it seems somewhat contradictory to argue that children
were both property and essentially worthless.
30. BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR 49 (1978). Tuchman notes that
in literature, for example, “the chief role of children was to die, usually drowned,
smothered, or abandoned in a forest on the orders of some king fearing prophecy
or mad husband testing a wife’s endurance.” Id.
31. Id. at 52.
32. BARBARA A. HANAWALT, OF GOOD AND ILL REPUTE: GENDER AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 174 (1998). In particular, Hanawalt notes the
importance of the whole community, rather than just individual families, in
children’s lives. Id. at 158–75. See also TUCHMAN, supra note 30, at 52 (noting that
children had toys and that “[l]ittle boys were like little boys of any time . . . .”).
33. HANAWALT, supra note 32, at 194 n.1.
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excluded from the feudal social structure in which relationships
34
were ordered and based on a hierarchy of duty and obedience. As
one might expect, the thread of this relationship structure that
posited children’s duties (without any sense of corresponding
35
rights) has been very persistent.
C. Post-Reformation
The importance of status and a hierarchy of authority based
on duty and obedience perhaps explains what otherwise seems as
an anomaly regarding children’s rights.
That is, in postReformation England, children often occupied positions of great
36
power. The explanation for this may be that prevailing notions
regarding duty and obedience did not particularly distinguish
37
between children and adults. Rather than being about children,
38
the point was to reinforce status relationships. But the weight of
political and social reform that began in England in the late
sixteenth century was transported to the American colonies and
shifted the justification of authority from status to consent.
Because of the widespread belief that children were immature and
incapable of looking after themselves physically, mentally, and
39
emotionally, children were viewed as being unable to consent.
Thus, childhood became a distinct legal status because children
40
were perceived as lacking the ability to form their own judgments.
34. HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLOAMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY 103 (2005). But Brewer also notes that feudal
rules, such as primogeniture, gave great power to the very young. Id.
35. See, e.g., Miller v. Monson, 228 Minn. 400, 401–02, 37 N.W.2d 543, 544–45
(1949) (stating that child has a duty to render obedience and services to the
parent).
36. BREWER, supra note 34, at 26–29.
37. Id. at 29.
38. Id.
39. The influence of thinkers such as Locke and Mill is frequently noted in
this respect. For Locke, parents had a duty to take care of their offspring “during
the imperfect state of childhood . . . [and to] govern the actions of their yet
ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place and ease them of that trouble . . . .”
JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government, in MAN AND THE STATE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS 89 (Saxe
Commins & Robert N. Linscott, eds., 1947). Similarly, Mill excluded children from
his principle of liberty because they were not “in the maturity of their faculties . . .
[and] must be protected against their own actions as well as against external
injury.”
JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 73 (Everyman’s Library ed., J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.
1940) (1859).
40. BREWER, supra note 34, at 7.
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D. Modern Approaches
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a nascent
children’s rights movement opposed the view that children were
primarily quasi-property and economic assets. Indeed, as economic
assets, children were probably little better off than animals and it
was not until scandals such as the “Mary Ellen Affair” that
41
organizations devoted to child protection began to emerge. That
organized child protection should arise so late is not so surprising
when one considers that nineteenth-century courts were generally
42
loath to interfere in matters of family government. Courts were
guided by a tradition of individual autonomy that kept the
government out of purely family affairs, thereby limiting the
43
government’s role in protecting children.
By contrast, the
Progressive movement, which continued into the early part of the
twentieth century, focused on broad child welfare reforms as being
44
integral to development of a more humane society. For the
reformers, children’s rights grew out of their dependency and
45
capacity for growth. Therefore, for Progressives, it was essential
for society to protect children from abuse, even where the abusers
46
were their parents, and to pass laws regulating child labor and
41. In 1874, a New York court ordered that ten-year-old Mary Ellen Wilson be
removed from the abusive home of her putative biological father’s widow. Mary
Ellen’s plight came to light largely through the efforts of Henry Bergh, then
president of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.
Subsequent publicity directly led to the American Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children being established. See American Humane: Who We Are: Mary
Ellen Wilson, http://www.americanhumane.org/site/PageServer?pagename=wh_
mission_maryellen (last visited March 24, 2007). Interestingly, despite its original
intention to prevent child abuse, the Society initially dealt primarily with poverty,
not abuse. Andrea Charlow, Race, Poverty, and Neglect, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
763, 764 (2001). But see Appell, supra note 4, at 158 (noting that protecting
children did not include protecting enslaved or newly freed children).
42. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453 (1868).
43. Elizabeth Bartholet, The Challenge of Children’s Rights Advocacy: Problems and
Progress in the Area of Child Abuse and Neglect, 3 WHITTIER J. OF CHILD & FAM. ADVOC.
215, 217 (2004).
44. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 1 (2005).
45. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Sarah Rebecca Katz, Martyrs, the Media and
the Web: Examining Grassroots Children’s Rights Movement Through the Lens of Social
Movement Theory, 5 WHITTIER J. OF CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 121, 125 (2005).
46. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 44, at 2. As Guggenheim also points out, these
advances were strongly resisted. As late as 1924, the President of Columbia
University condemned proposed child labor laws because “they would empower
Congress to invade the rights of parents and to shape family life to its liking.” Id.
at 3.
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providing for compulsory education.
Despite setbacks, the
Progressive movement was ultimately successful in raising
awareness of children’s issues and, significantly, in the
49
establishment of the juvenile court system.
The most recent burst of enthusiasm for children’s rights arose
in the 1960s and 1970s and was strongly influenced by
50
commentators who viewed children as victims of discrimination or
51
as an oppressed group in need of liberation. As such, children
were seen to be in essentially the same position as racial minorities
52
or women. This conception of children’s rights identified state
interference as preventing children from being autonomous
53
beings. Ironically, according to this view, the advances gained by
the Progressive movement worked against children who were now
enmeshed in a system that denied them autonomy and personal
54
freedom. For children’s rights advocates, this problem may arise
because the focus is on children’s interests and in protecting them
55
from themselves and others. Thus, grounding children’s rights in
dependency on others merely reaffirms children’s vulnerability and
56
helplessness.
By contrast, advocates may focus on liberty rights as a basis for
57
children’s rights and advance rights claims based on a child’s
58
Of course, this approach comes closer
individual personhood.
than the dependency view to holding a child to be an autonomous
47. Id. at 2.
48. E.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (declaring federal laws
regulating child labor to be unconstitutional).
49. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 44, at 4.
50. RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 1 (1974).
51. See JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 26–29 (1974).
52. Appell, supra note 4, at 153.
53. Id.
54. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 44, at 6.
55. See, e.g., Federle, supra note 7, at 1590. Federle argues that by linking
“rights-generating interests to children’s incapacities, interest theorists suggest that
children are incapable of caring for themselves.” Id. See also, Appell, supra note 4,
at 166–71. Appell criticizes dependency rights as being “no more than a question
of competing adult values, in which dominant values—those appreciated by the
state—are likely to prevail.” Id. at 171.
56. Appell, supra note 4, at 171.
57. See, e.g., id. at 154–55 for an outline of what Appell calls “quasi-civil
rights.” See also Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 114 n.33 (noting that the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized children’s rights in many different settings, from
education to juvenile justice).
58. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 44, at 13. For Guggenheim, this is a fatally
flawed premise because it runs the risk of “isolating children from the larger fabric
of society into which they have been born and are being raised.” Id.
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individual with his or her own personal rights, rather than being
59
the property of either the parents or the state. Recognizing that
children have individual personhood entails recognizing that
children are not merely extensions of their parents with the
capacity to develop into autonomous actors, if not necessarily
having the present capacity to act autonomously.
E. International Context
The growth of children’s rights in international and
transnational law has been identified as a striking change in the
60
post-war legal landscape. The principles enumerated by the 1959
United Nations’ Declaration of the Rights of the Child (UNDRC)
included children’s rights in the rubric of fundamental human
rights and focused on children’s rights as arising from their
dependency needs, rather than as being autonomous, individual
61
rights. For instance, Principle 6 of the UNDRC provided for the
full and harmonious development of children’s personalities
through love and understanding, through growing up in the care
and under the responsibility of parents, and “in any case, in an
62
atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security.”
Moreover, the UNDRC identified the best interests of the child as
the paramount consideration for States in enacting laws to promote
63
child development.
Subsequently, the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights
64
of the Child (CRC) set forth a broad range of dependency,
65
autonomy, and equality rights. Some of the rights in the CRC
remain merely aspirational, but a more significant problem may be
that there is an internal conflict between individual autonomy
enjoyed by the child and the role of the family, in particular the
66
authority enjoyed by parents, in relation to children. It has now
59. See Jamie D. Manasco, Parent-Child Relationships: The Impetus Behind the
Gregory K. Decision, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 243, 258 (1993).
60. Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 108.
61. Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), at pmbl. 14
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16 at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959).
62. Id. at princ. 6.
63. Id. at princ. 2. Notwithstanding the inclusion of the best interests
standard, the UNDRC also endorsed the tender years doctrine. See id. at princ. 6.
64. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, ¶ 44 U.N.
GAOR. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/736 (Nov. 28, 1989).
65. See Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 109.
66. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 64, art. 14. Paragraph 1 of Article 14
provides that “States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of
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become something of a truism that the United States remains the
only nation not to have ratified the CRC. While this may not have
67
anything to do with children’s rights, it is, nevertheless, a
conspicuous absence.
III.

AUTONOMY AND THE CONCEPT OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS

On one level, it makes little sense to think of children’s rights
as arising from their status as autonomous individuals. To suggest
that a child is autonomous is to suggest that he or she is either self68
governing or capable of existing or functioning independently.
This is not always self-evidently true to the extent that children
69
exhibit defects of practical rationality.
That is to say, young
children in particular cannot tailor their current actions to take
account of later desires, such as conserving water now for later
70
thirst. Of course, this is not to say that children do not make, and
71
act on, independent decisions. Much depends on the child’s age,
since even the most ardent children’s rights advocate would not
suggest that a child under five, for example, is capable of acting
autonomously in the sense that the child, in making a choice, is
72
assuming responsibility for all foreseeable consequences. Indeed,
thought, conscience and religion,” whereas paragraph 2 provides that “States
Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable,
legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right
in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.” Id., art. 14, ¶¶ 1,
2. This conflict has been noted by an Irish examination of children’s rights law.
See LAW REFORM COMMITTEE OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND, RIGHTS-BASED CHILD
LAW: THE CASE FOR REFORM 57–58 (2006), http://www.lawsociety.ie/documents/
committees/lawreform/childreport06.pdf.
The report also notes that
enforcement of the Convention is compromised by the vagueness of its
language—which makes incorporation into national law difficult—and, perhaps
more importantly, that there is no enforcement mechanism. Id. But see
Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 109 (“The CRC’s most important role is not in
articulating claims to be asserted by children in court . . . but is in proposing
norms of justice to guide those engaged in developing laws and social policies.”).
67. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 44, at 15. Guggenheim suggests that the
United States’ failure to ratify the CRC does not amount to a repudiation of
children’s rights. I think this view underestimates the importance of perception in
international law.
68. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 47 (4th ed. 2001).
69. See David A. J. Richards, Rights and Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL 203,
206 (John Christman, ed., 1989).
70. Id.
71. On a trivial level, even very young children can choose whether to have
cereal or toast, or both, for breakfast. But this does not necessarily indicate
autonomy, as children may not have any say whatsoever in the range of choices.
72. Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL, supra note 69, at 27, 42.
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recent research into brain changes in adolescence suggests that the
frontal areas of the brain responsible for high-level reasoning and
decision making do not fully mature until adulthood or their early
73
twenties.
Consequently, minor children typically are not
74
considered to be fully rational, autonomous individuals. Scholars
have defined autonomy, in this sense, as “the capacities, developed
or undeveloped, of persons, which enable them to develop, want to
75
act on, and act on higher-order plans of action. . . .” Additionally,
at least in the Western tradition of rights, autonomy is part and
parcel of our bundle of negative rights: the right to pursue our own
individual ideas of good, to be left alone, and to be free from
76
unwarranted state intervention in our lives.
On this basis, then, it is somewhat natural to be skeptical of
negative, autonomy-based rights insofar as such rights are
attributed to all children qua children. This is particularly so when
viewed against the background of the United States Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding negative children’s rights, as
77
manifested in DeShaney.
In DeShaney, a four-year-old boy, Joshua, was beaten repeatedly
by his father and suffered serious and permanent brain damage
despite the fact that the Wisconsin child protection services had
known of the abuse and had repeatedly failed to take action to
78
The case is clearly a “hard” one
remove Joshua from harm.
because it involved senseless assaults by a parent on a defenseless
child. But just as importantly, however, it highlights the very
narrow protections offered children by the negative rights granted
79
under the Due Process Clause as interpreted by DeShaney. It has
73. Robert S. Boyd, Teenage Trouble? Blame It on Their Brains, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Dec. 19, 2006, at A1. See generally DAVID WALSH, WHY DO THEY ACT
THAT WAY 37 (2004). While beyond the scope of this article, the impact of such
recent research involving childhood cognitive and emotional development on
areas of family law and juvenile justice would be a fruitful area for study.
74. See Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2004).
75. Richards, supra note 69, at 205.
76. See Ezer, supra note 74, at 4.
77. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
78. Id. at 192–93. Joshua’s abuse was well-documented, as was his caseworker’s chilling remark when told of Joshua’s last beating that “I just knew the
phone would ring some day and Joshua would be dead.” Id. at 209 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at 195 (majority opinion). The Court drew a sharp distinction
between public and private action, concluding that there was no constitutional
right to protection against private violence. See also Town of Castle Rock v.
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been noted that the Court could not sustain this purely negative
80
constitutional view, leaving open the possibility of the State having
81
affirmative duties to care for and protect certain individuals, and
that the State may not deny protective services to disfavored
82
minorities. Nonetheless, the Court refused to accept the notion
that the government has a duty to protect children even where the
government is responsible for the child remaining in known
83
danger, thus supporting the proposition that an autonomy model
predicated on a right to be free from interference is inadequate for
84
children.
Despite the differences between children and adults, some
commentators have categorized children’s rights that presuppose
85
children’s autonomy.
For example, the empowerment
perspective attributes competencies to children that enable them
86
to act autonomously in legal proceedings affecting them. This
view is critical both of interest-based rights and of feminist theories
of rights that emphasize relationships between individuals and
reject traditional approaches to rights in which autonomy is
87
central.
But autonomy seems to be necessary to the
empowerment perspective because it requires that children act
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). In Town of Castle Rock, three children were
murdered by their father after law enforcement failed to enforce a domestic abuse
order. Id. at 754. The Court held that the benefit to a third party in having
someone arrested for a crime generally does not trigger Due Process Clause
protections. Id. at 768.
80. Ezer, supra note 74, at 21.
81. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198.
82. Id. at 197 n.3.
83. See id. at 202.
84. See Ezer, supra note 74, at 38. Ezer argues that a better approach would
be to ground children’s rights in “positive” freedom based on human dignity and
children’s development and potential. This approach emphasizes that “[s]tanding
alone, neither emphasis on autonomy, dependence, nor development provides a
complete picture of children’s rights.” Id. at 41.
85. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 7, at 260 (stating four different types of claims
under children’s rights, vis-à-vis, generalized claims against the world, protection
from abuse or neglect, the right to be treated equally with adults by the state, and
the right to act independently of parental control); Woodhouse, supra note 5, at
114–22 (describing five principles governing rights schemes: equality, individual
dignity, privacy, protection, and empowerment).
86. See Federle, supra note 7, at 1601 (suggesting that adherence to the
empowerment perspective provides children a crucial voice and bargaining power
in legal proceedings); see also infra Part IV.
87. Federle, supra note 7, at 1591–92. For Federle, however, tying rights to
relationships is just another way of saying that children have interests that have to
be protected because they are incompetent. Id.
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independently to vindicate their own rights, albeit with competent
88
representation to advocate the children’s interests and wishes. It
may well be true that the empowerment perspective separates
rights from interests, and therefore avoids reaffirming children’s
89
vulnerability and helplessness; but if these rights are not
90
relationship rights, then it is unclear where they are grounded
unless we attribute to children the same negative rights that we
attribute to adults, thus implying that children are equally capable
of autonomous, free choices. But we treat children differently
precisely because we make assumptions about their incapacity to
act in an adult manner and thereby try to foster their growth
91
toward autonomous citizens.
That we do not attribute to children the capacity to make
autonomous, free choices is perhaps not least because of the
difficulty of delineating a theory of rights that is appropriate for all
92
children at all stages of development. Therefore, it may be more
productive to view autonomy as latent in the sense that it is present
in all persons, including children, but that the capacity to exercise
93
it may be restricted. At the same time, the capacity to exercise it
94
might also be encouraged. The question then becomes how we
might best do that; it is perhaps in this area that the empowerment
perspective is of some value. It may ensure that at least some
children have a voice in matters that directly affect them and
95
tangibly recognize their capacity for autonomy.
Standing in
judicial proceedings may be a place to start. One way to do this
88. Id. at 1600. Advocating for children’s interests and children’s wishes need
not be the same thing, of course. A guardian ad litem normally advises the court
on a child’s interests. An attorney normally must represent her client’s wishes.
89. Id. at 1591.
90. Children’s rights may not necessarily be relational rights. See, e.g., Ezer,
supra note 74, at 1 (noting that the term “child” does not stand alone but
necessarily implies a relationship).
91. Wald, supra note 7, at 266.
92. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon & Robert G. Schwartz, Foreword: Looking Back,
Looking Ahead: The Evolution of Children’s Rights, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1557, 1561 (1995)
(pointing out that children’s developmental years are continuously changing and
that one set of rights may not be appropriate for all levels of children).
93. Alexander McCall Smith, Is Anything Left of Parental Rights?, in FAMILY
RIGHTS, 5–6 (Elaine Sutherland & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1990).
94. Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 118–20.
95. Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should
Do for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237, 324–25 (1999). See
also Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 118 (stating that empowerment respects
children’s individuality while within the context of their eventual capacity for
autonomy).
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may be to expand the statutory schemes, which permit children to
have standing and representation in termination of parental rights
and neglect proceedings, to include proceedings such as those
involving domestic abuse where children’s interests may be adverse
to parents and where they do not benefit from statutory rights to
96
representation. A move in this direction may reflect “graduated
standing” that takes into account children’s development and their
capacity to act autonomously.
IV. AUTONOMY AND LEGAL STANDING
An autonomy-based approach to children’s rights suggests that
it is appropriate to grant standing to children in family law cases
that can profoundly affect their interests and their lives. Indeed,
not only would it be appropriate—it would be necessary to
vindicate children’s rights that might be opposed to those of their
parents or others. For example, children’s interests will be adverse
97
to at least one of their parents in family violence cases.
Though there may be statutory bases for the permissive joinder
98
99
of children and of third parties in custody proceedings, standing
is the right to take the initial steps in framing legal issues ultimately
100
to be decided by a court or jury. One must have, in an individual
101
or representative capacity, a real interest in the cause of action.
Thus, standing requires that a party has a sufficient stake in a
102
justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.
Such a stake
has been defined as having a substantial, direct, and immediate
103
interest in the subject-matter litigation.
Read in this way, it makes perfect sense that the child of a
marriage should be a party as a matter of course to the dissolution
104
of that marriage.
Additionally, from the point of view of
96. Goodmark, supra note 95, at 319.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.60 (2006) (providing for permissive joinder in
paternity actions).
99. E.g., Murray v. Antell, 361 N.W.2d 466, 468–69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(permitting joinder of stepfather in former husband’s motion to modify custody).
100. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 2004).
101. E.g., Presidential Capital Corp. v. Reale, 652 A.2d 489, 504 (Conn. 1994).
102. Alliance for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 913
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731–32
(1972)).
103. Frank v. Frank, 833 A.2d 194, 196 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
104. Indeed, some proponents of children’s rights take such a position. See,
e.g., Federle, supra note 7, at 1600–01. Federle describes the hypothetical cases of
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children’s autonomy, it would seem to follow that children should
have standing and be parties as of right to family law proceedings
105
that affect their interests. It is difficult to argue that children do
not have a sufficient stake in the outcome of a marriage dissolution
case that may well determine where the child lives and with
106
whom. But children are generally not considered to be parties to
107
marriage dissolution proceedings.
This is so even though the
dissolution binds children to the parts of the dissolution judgment
108
that resolve the child-related aspects of the dissolution. Children
are also denied standing in their parents’ custody and visitation
cases, largely on the theory that at least one of the parents will
109
adequately represent the child’s interests.
As a result, courts
place children in the same place as adult would-be interveners
whose personal or family interests do not constitute an “interest”
110
sufficient to support intervention as of right. Instead of children
“Ashley,” who would have the right to participate as a party, which would mean
more than simply participating in the process. Id. “Ashley” would necessarily have
standing as a party in all divorce proceedings affecting her family. Id.
105. But see Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 119 (noting that state laws and judges
routinely deny children standing in family law cases).
106. Of course, children might be excluded in the sense that they are typically
not parties to the original marriage contract. See, e.g., In re Estate of Crockett, 728
N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (stating the widely held position that marriage
is a civil contract with three interested parties: the husband, the wife, and the
State). But children might be considered to be third-party beneficiaries with
interests and/or rights that should be protected. See, e.g., Morelli v. Morelli, 720
P.2d 704, 706 (Nev. 1986) (holding that a child was a third-party beneficiary of her
parents’ separation agreement providing for payment of the adult child’s college
expenses); Drake v. Drake, 455 N.Y.S.2d 420, 424 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding
that children may enforce specific provisions of their parents’ separation
agreement that are made exclusively for the benefit of the child, such as to
provide for the child’s educational expenses). See also Armstrong v. Armstrong,
544 P.2d 941, 951 (Cal. 1976) (concluding that children were bound by judgment
in divorce action to which their mother was a party, but conceiving situations
where parent’s and child’s interests may be opposed).
107. See Kielley v. Kielley, 674 N.W.2d 770, 776 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). See
also MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 302.04(a) (providing for party designations in various
family law proceedings and permitting subsequent references to “husband” and
“wife”).
108. Kielley, 674 N.W.2d at 776 n.1.
109. E.g., In re Marriage of Thompson, 651 N.E.2d 222 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
110. Van Meveren v. Van Meveren, 603 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999). The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure permit intervention as of right
where (1) the motion to intervene was timely; (2) there is an interest relating to
the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) as a practical
matter, disposition of the action may impair or impede the party’s ability to
protect that interest; and (4) the party is not adequately represented by the
existing parties. MINN. R. CIV. P. 24.01. But Rule 24.01 has been interpreted to
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having standing, a court may, or in some cases must, appoint a
111
guardian ad litem to represent children’s interests. In addition, a
child over the age of 14 may apply for the appointment of a
112
guardian ad litem.
Two well-known Florida cases illustrate divergent approaches
to autonomy and children’s rights to standing in legal proceedings.
Kingsley adhered to the general rule that children are not entitled
113
to bring legal proceedings in their own names.
In Kingsley, an
eleven-year-old boy sought to terminate his mother’s parental
rights by suing in his own name. Concluding that the district court
had erred in allowing him to do so, the Florida District Court of
Appeal held that non-age was a disability that prevented a child
114
from initiating such an action. Rather, while the child is the real
party in interest, courts require that an adult of reasonable
judgment and integrity act for the child as his or her “next
115
friend.” Thus, as a procedural disability, non-age could be cured
116
By contrast, a Florida
by appointment of guardian ad litem.
circuit court concluded that Kimberley Mays had standing to sue in
her own name to sever all ties, including visitation rights, with her
117
biological parents. Kimberley had been “swapped” at birth with a
child, Arlena Twigg, who later died.
Blood tests revealed
Kimberley’s true identity and her biological parents sought to
establish visitation with her. After some efforts to do so, the
relationship broke down and Kimberley sued to sever ties with her

preclude intervention as of right in family law situations. Valentine v. Lutz, 512
N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1994). Moreover, a child who wishes to intervene would
also have to persuade a court that his or her interests are not protected by the
existing parties, i.e., the parents.
111. MINN. STAT. § 518.165, subdivs. 1 and 2 (2006) (providing for permissive
appointment or, in cases where the court has reason to believe a child is a victim
of domestic child abuse or neglect, mandatory appointment). But in both
situations, appointment of a guardian applies only “where custody or parenting
time with a minor child is in issue . . . .” Id. Therefore, there is no provision for
appointing a guardian to advise the court on effects of a property settlement, for
example, on a child’s interests.
112. See, e.g., MINN. R. CIV. P. 17.02.
113. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650 (1979)).
114. Id. at 783.
115. Id. at 784.
116. Id. See also In re Petition of Frazer, 721 A.2d. 920, 921 (Del. 1998)
(holding the issue of non-age curable by appointing a guardian ad litem).
117. Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 18, 1993).
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118

biological parents.
The Twigg court concluded that Kimberley
had standing based on its reading of two separate provisions of the
119
Florida Constitution. The first provided that children are “natural
persons” and that minors as well as adults possess constitutional
120
The second, that “[t]he courts shall be open to every
rights.
121
person for redress of any injury.”
Having concluded that
Kimberley had standing, the court held that it would be
detrimental to Kimberley to declare her to be the Twigg’s
122
biological child.
Both the Kingsley and the Twigg cases involved the right of
children to maintain termination of parental rights actions in their
123
own names.
Although the courts reached different conclusions
on the standing issue, for the children, the results were the same:
each achieved termination of their biological parents’ parental
124
rights.
As a result, the question remained as to whether a child
had status to sue on his or her own behalf to sever parental
125
The cases could indicate an inclination to address each
rights.
case on its merits, and, though not swinging the courthouse doors
wide open for children to sue on their own behalf, at least leaving
126
them unlocked.
Perhaps this is so, but since Kingsley and Twigg,
there has been no great clamoring to open the courthouse doors.
This may be because courts remain wary of intruding into areas
traditionally reserved for parental authority even where, for
standing purposes, a child is within the zone of interests that a
127
statute or constitutional guarantee protects.
Subsequently, in an unreported decision in Ramos v. Cox, a
Connecticut court considered a child’s right to challenge a
128
paternity judgment in her own name.
In Ramos, the parents
acknowledged Cox as Brianna’s father pursuant to Connecticut
118. Id. at *2.
119. Id. at *3.
120. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23).
121. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21).
122. Id. at *6.
123. See Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780; Twiggs, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624.
124. Scott A. Cannon, Finding Their Own “Place to Be”: What Gregory Kingsley’s
and Kimberley Mays’ “Divorces” From Their Parents Have Done for Children’s Rights, 39
LOY. L. REV. 837, 853 (1994).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 855.
127. Frank v. Frank, 833 A.2d 194, 197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
128. Ramos v. Cox, No. FA000630917, 2002 WL 31894798, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Dec. 3, 2002).
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129

law.
The parents then resided together and became the parents
130
Later, Brianna sued to vacate the paternity
of twin girls.
131
judgment on a number of grounds, including fraud.
The court
noted that it would be “peculiar to recognize the interest of the
child to the determination of parentage and then deny her
standing in legal proceedings based on or involving that
132
determination.”
Therefore, it concluded that Brianna had
standing, through her guardian ad litem, to pursue the motion to
133
vacate and to be heard on pending motions.
By contrast, in Frank v. Frank, three teenage children sought to
modify a custody order of joint physical custody to sole physical
custody in their mother, a Christian, following their conversion
134
from Judaism. The father was Jewish.
Noting that the custody
issues had already been fully litigated, the court held that the
mother was seeking to relitigate the trial court’s denial of her
135
petition for reconsideration raising the same claims.
The court
may well have been correct in this assessment. But even if the case
had been an original custody determination rather than a
modification proceeding, the court would still have held that the
136
children lacked standing.
Pennsylvania law does provide that
137
children may express a preference in custody matters, as does
138
The child’s preference may be
that of most other jurisdictions.
expressed through a guardian ad litem or, more commonly,
139
through interviews with a court-appointed evaluator.
But in
either case, it is the guardian or evaluator who ultimately makes
recommendations to the court based on her assessment of what is
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *3.
132. Id. But this notion has not necessarily troubled many courts. See supra
note 84 and accompanying text.
133. Ramos, 2002 WL 31894798, at *3. This still leaves open the question of
whether Brianna could pursue the case in her own name and be represented by an
attorney as opposed to a guardian. In any event, Brianna was ultimately unable to
produce sufficient evidence of fraud and her motion was unsuccessful. Id. at *6.
134. Frank, 833 A.2d at 195.
135. Id. at 197.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 198.
138. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2006) (providing that the court must evaluate
the reasonable preference of a child if the court deems the child to be of sufficient
age to express a preference).
139. A judge, of course, may interview children directly to ascertain their
preferences and, as such, they can speak directly. But for unrepresented children,
even a relatively informal interview could be intimidating.
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in the child’s best interests. The risk here is that children’s voice
will be muted, disregarded, or, perhaps, not even their own. On
the other hand, allowing children to have standing in proceedings
affecting their fundamental interests would serve two purposes: it
140
would grant a direct voice to developmentally capable children,
and it would advance an important societal interest in encouraging
and enhancing children’s capacity for developing into autonomous
141
citizens.
V.

CONCLUSION

A purely autonomy-based theory of children’s rights seems
inadequate in light of the way notions of children’s rights have
developed historically and in the way the law has considered issues
of standing in family law matters. The traditional view of autonomy
emphasizes negative freedoms, which seem inappropriate for
children.
How children’s rights should properly be conceived remains a
work in progress. It may be more productive to conceive of
children’s rights as being inherent in children as persons and to
ground children’s rights in dignity and protection rather than
purely on the position that children are autonomous legal actors.
At the same time, providing a system of graduated standing for
children in certain family law cases may provide an opportunity to
foster children’s development into autonomous citizens by allowing
them a clearer and more direct voice in proceedings that directly
affect their fundamental interests.

140.
141.

See Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 119.
See id. at 118. See also discussion supra Part III.
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